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SPECIAL FEATURE
WINNER, BEST APPELLATE BRIEF IN THE 2017 NATIVE
AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION MOOT COURT
COMPETITION*
Devon Suarez**& Simon Goldenberg***

Questions Presented
I. Did the Secretary of the Interior err by authorizing the acquisition of
land for the Miseño Band based on a determination that the Miseño meet
the first prong of the definition of “Indian” in Section 19 of the IRA?
II. Does Section 5 of the IRA constitute an unconstitutional exercise of
Congressional authority to the Secretary that violates the nondelegation
doctrine and the Tenth Amendment?
Statement of the Case
I. Statement of Facts
The Miseño people have lived in Southern California since time
immemorial. R. at 1. They first had contact with the Spanish in the lateeighteenth century, and a mission was subsequently built. R. at 1. Mexico
divided the mission lands into private land for its citizens in 1838, so long
as they did not interfere with the Miseño living there. R. at 1. After the
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, the United States sent Indian Affairs officials
to California to negotiate treaties with the tribes in the region, but the
* This brief has been edited from its original form for ease of reading. The record for
this brief comes from the 2017 National Native American Law Students Association Moot
Court Competition facts, which can be found at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/c50703_769cb
94824164c74b817ae43c4cb6a0b.pdf.
** Devon Suarez is a third-year student at Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at
Arizona State University. He is from Heber, a small town atop the Mogollon Rim in
northeastern Arizona. During his last semester of law school, he started a timber company.
The company is currently working with the federal government and non-profit organizations
to reduce wildfire risks and restore the pine forests of northern Arizona through stewardship
agreements.
*** Simon Goldenberg graduated from the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at
Arizona State University in May 2017, where he received an Indian Law Certificate.
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Miseño were never participants in negotiations or mentioned in reports. R.
at 1. By 1880, there was only one Miseño village left. R. at 1. The Miseño
were removed from that village after a family with title to the land
successfully brought suit against them in state court. R. at 1.
Despite their removal, many of the Miseño continued to live in the same
area, and still do today. R. at 2. The United States recognized the Miseño as
an Indian tribe in 1982. R. at 2. In 2005, the Miseño asked the Secretary of
the Interior (“the Secretary”) to obtain land near a former village site and
place it in trust. R. at 2. In 2010, the Department of the Interior (“the
Department”) produced a record of decision (“ROD”) confirming that the
land would be put into trust. R. at 2. The ROD interpreted 25 U.S.C. § 479
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carcieri v. Salazar. See
555 U.S. 379 (2009); R. at 2. The Department found that the Miseño were
“under federal jurisdiction” in 1934. This decision was based on an excerpt
from the 1851 Act to Ascertain and Settle Private Land Claims in the State
of California, the 1891 Mission Indian Relief Act, the history of Miseño
children attending the Sherman Indian Boarding School, and payments the
Miseño received under the California Indians Jurisdictional Act and Indian
Claims Commission Act. R. at 2-3. Consequently, the land acquisition was
lawful. R. at 2.
In 2013, Scream Out for California (“SOFC”) sued the Secretary and the
Department asserting that the ROD was a violation of the Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”). R. at 3. SOFC claims there is no evidence of
federal Indian agents exerting any jurisdiction over the Miseño. R. at 3.
Therefore, the Miseño was not a recognized tribe or under federal
jurisdiction in 1934. R. at 3. Furthermore, SOFC argued the land
acquisition was an unconstitutional delegation of power to the Secretary
because Congress failed to articulate an intelligible principle to guide the
Secretary’s discretion. R. at 3; see 25 U.S.C. § 465. Specifically, § 465
violates the Tenth Amendment by intruding on core principles of state
sovereignty. R. at 3.
II. Statement of Proceedings
The Miseño Band intervened in the case, and both sides filed motions for
summary judgment. R. at 3. In 2014, the District Court for the Central
District of California ruled in the Secretary’s favor. R. at 3. In 2015, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling. R. at 3. In 2016,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the following:
1) whether the Secretary erred in finding that the Miseño qualify as an
“Indian” under § 479; and 2) if § 465 is an unconstitutional use of
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legislative authority that violates the nondelegation doctrine or the Tenth
Amendment. R. at 3-4.
Argument
I. The Miseño were not a recognized Indian tribe nor under federal
recognition in 1934, thus the Secretary of Interior’s ROD was arbitrary and
capricious and otherwise contrary to law.
Supreme Court precedent demands that lands cannot be taken into trust
for tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The Secretary’s
ROD should not receive deference because Congress spoke unambiguously
in 25 U.S.C. § 479 that a tribe must have been recognized and under federal
jurisdiction in 1934. Further, even if the ROD receives deference, the
Secretary’s interpretation of § 479 is unreasonable because Congress spoke
unambiguously. Therefore, the ROD should be afforded no deference.
Even if the ROD is entitled to deference, the Secretary was arbitrary and
capricious in concluding that the Miseño were under federal jurisdiction in
1934 because the record does not support the Secretary’s conclusion.
Furthermore, the Miseño do not fall within an exception to the Carcieri rule
because the Secretary was arbitrary and capricious in issuing an ROD
contrary to law.
A. Precedent dictates the Secretary cannot accept the lands into trust.
Once the court has determined the meaning of a statute, it adheres to its
“ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis, and [assesses] an agency's later
interpretation of the statute against that settled law." Neal v. United States,
516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996). “A court's prior judicial construction of a statute
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference
only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,
545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005).
The Court previously held, “for purposes of § 479, ‘now under Federal
jurisdiction’ refers to a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the time
of the statute’s enactment.” Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382 (2009).
Further, “§ 479 limits the Secretary’s authority to taking land into trust for
the purpose of providing land to members of a tribe that was under federal
jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in June 1934.” Id. at 382. In this
case, the Miseño were not recognized until 1982. R. at 2. The Miseño were
not under federal jurisdiction in 1934 as the Carcieri rule requires of an
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Indian tribe in order to have land taken into trust. The facts demonstrate that
the commissioners sent to California did not document the presence of the
Miseño. Further, the Miseño were not part of any treaties or negotiations
with the federal government. The record further shows that the U.S. had
little-to-no contact with the Miseño until well after 1934. This demonstrates
that the U.S. does not hold the Miseño out to be under federal jurisdiction
since they did not note any relationship with them. The law is well settled
that tribes need to be recognized and under federal jurisdiction by 1934; the
Secretary therefore cannot accept land into trust for the Band because of the
Carcieri holding, since the Miseño do not fit the criteria.
B. The ROD should not receive Chevron deference because Congress
spoke unambiguously in § 479 and the Secretary’s interpretation of the
statute is unreasonable.
When reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers
through its actions and decisions, a court is confronted with two questions:
“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984). If Congress has spoken clearly on the issue, “the court as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The canon of statutory
construction of “clear meaning” dictates that if a statute is plain and
unambiguous, a court must apply the statute according to its terms and clear
meaning. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Estate of Cowart
v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992). The presumption is that
Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it
says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).
Further, the canon of construction requires “the court to give effect . . . to
every clause and word of a statute.” Inhabitants of the Twp. of Montclair v.
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883). If, in the first prong of the Chevron
analysis, the court determines that Congress did not speak directly to the
issue, “the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute,
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.”
Chevron, 476 U.S. at 843. If the statute does not speak directly to the issue
or if the court determines it is ambiguous, “the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.” Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss2/10

No. 2]

SPECIAL FEATURE

487

i. Congress spoke unambiguously in § 479, thus the ROD should not be
afforded Chevron deference.
The Secretary’s ROD should not be afforded Chevron deference because
Congress spoke unambiguously in the The Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 (“IRA”). “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If Congress has spoken clearly on the
issue, “the court as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84243. Thus, to give effect to Congress’s intent, the agency and the Court must
do exactly what Congress instructs.
In the present case, Congress spoke unambiguously in the IRA that the
Secretary is authorized to accept land into trust for “the purpose of
providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 465. For the purposes of that
Act, “. . . ‘Indian’ . . . shall include all persons of Indian descent who are
members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” 25
U.S.C. § 479. “[F]or purposes of § 479, ‘now under Federal jurisdiction’
refers to a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the time of the
statute’s enactment.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379, 382. Further, “§ 479 limits the
Secretary’s authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of providing
land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction when the IRA
was enacted in June 1934.” Id. at 382. As Carcieri makes clear, it is settled
law that “now” in the IRA strictly refers to tribes that were “under federal
jurisdiction” in 1934. 25 U.S.C. § 479. Canons of statutory construction
inform us that a statute must be given its clear meaning and applied
according to its terms. Estate of Cowart, 505 U.S. at 476. Consequently,
courts must give effect to every word and provision in a statute. Inhabitants
of the Twp. of Montclair, 107 U.S. at 152.
Using the statute’s language, canons of construction, and case law, the
meaning of the statute is unambiguous. At the time of the enactment of the
IRA, “now” meant “at the present time; at this moment; at the time of
speaking.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 388 (quoting Webster’s New International
Dictionary 1671 (2d ed. 1934)). There is little doubt that “now under
Federal jurisdiction” means that a tribe must be under federal jurisdiction in
1934. 25 U.S.C. § 479. The preceding “any recognized Indian tribe”
language is equally unambiguous. 25 U.S.C. § 479. The canons of statutory
construction require the statute to be read in its totality, giving effect to
every word. The phrase, “ . . . all persons of Indian descent who are
members of any recognized Indian tribe” must therefore be given effect and
read in conjunction with “now under Federal jurisdiction” as a singular
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clause without a break. 25 U.S.C. § 479. A natural reading of the statute
indicates that an “Indian” is a person of Indian descent who is a member of
any recognized tribe now under Federal jurisdiction. While “now” modifies
and provides temporal constraints on “Federal jurisdiction,” the phrase
qualifies “any recognized Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 479. Thus, “any
recognized tribe” must be “now under Federal jurisdiction.” 25 U.S.C. §
479. Therefore, the proper reading of the statute, while giving effect to all
parts of it, unambiguously states: an Indian is a person of Indian decent who
is a member of any recognized tribe that was under federal jurisdiction in
1934. The whole clause must be given effect and cannot be read as two
separate clauses.
As enacted in statute, the Secretary has the authority to take land into
trust for recognized Indian tribes that were under federal jurisdiction in
1934; the entire clause is inseparable and must be read together as one. The
agency and the court must give effect to Congress’ will because they
unambiguously spoke on the issue. Accordingly, because Congress spoke
unambiguously in § 479, the Secretary must give effect to Congress’ will
and take land into trust only for recognized tribes under federal jurisdiction
in 1934. See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 382.
ii. Because the Secretary’s interpretation of § 479 is unreasonable, the
ROD should not be afforded Chevron deference.
In the first prong of the Chevron analysis, if the Court determines that
Congress did not speak directly to the issue, “the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation.” Chevron, 476 U.S. at 843. If
the statute does not speak directly to the issue or if the court determines it is
ambiguous, “the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. Thus, even if the
court concludes that the statute was ambiguous, the court may determine
that the agency interpreted the statute unreasonably and should be afforded
no Chevron deference.
“[F]or purposes of § 479, ‘now under Federal jurisdiction’ refers to a
tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the time of the statute’s
enactment.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379, 382. Further, “§ 479 limits the
Secretary’s authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of providing
land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction when the IRA
was enacted in June 1934.” Id. at 382. In this case, the Secretary interpreted
the statute as requiring him to “determine whether an Indian tribe was
‘under Federal jurisdiction’ in 1934, the year the IRA was enacted, before
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the Secretary can acquire land in trust for that tribe.” R. at 2. Further, the
Secretary interpreted the statute to mean that “now . . . modifies only the
phrase ‘under Federal jurisdiction’” and that a tribe “need only be
‘recognized at the time of the land acquisition.” R. at 2. While the Secretary
is correct that the Court held that “now under federal jurisdiction” meant
that the tribe must be under federal jurisdiction in 1934, he misinterprets the
preceding language to mean that the tribe need only be recognized before
he may take land into trust for the tribe. As Carcieri held, “§ 479 limits the
Secretary’s authority to tak[e] land into trust for the purpose of providing
land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction when the IRA
was enacted in June 1934.” 555 U.S. 379 at 382. The holding is clear that
the IRA only grants the Secretary authority to take land into trust for tribes
that were under federal jurisdiction in 1934; if a tribe is not under federal
jurisdiction, the Secretary may not take land into trust. Not only does
Carcieri provide precedential influence, it also provides a more reasonable
interpretation of the statute than the agency’s current interpretation.
In this case, the Miseño were not a recognized tribe or under federal
jurisdiction in 1934 or any time before that. The fact that the Miseño were
not federally recognized until 1982 weighs against the tribe because
Congress prescribed in the IRA that the secretary may only take land into
trust for Indian tribes who are a “ . . . recognized Indian tribe now under
Federal jurisdiction.” 25 U.S.C. § 479. Like the Narragansett in Carcieri,
the Miseño were not federally recognized until the 1980s. Further, like the
Narragansett, the Miseño were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
There, the Court held that because the Narragansett were not under federal
jurisdiction in 1934, the Secretary lacked the authority to take land into
trust. The facts in Carcieri are quite similar to the facts here. While the tribe
may have had some contacts with the State, the tribe had little to no formal
contact with the federal government. There, the Court held that the
Secretary could not take land into trust because the tribe was not under
federal jurisdiction in 1934. Accordingly, given the Court’s previous
interpretation along with canons of statutory construction, the Secretary’s
interpretation of the statute is unreasonable.
C. The ROD is arbitrary and capricious.
When reviewing an agency action or decision, “the reviewing court
shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A). Additionally,
a court may hold an agency action “unlawful and set aside agency action,
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findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unwarranted by the facts to the
extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.” 5
U.S.C. § 706 (2)(F). If Congress has left any ambiguity in a statute,
Congress delegates to the agency the authority to give the statute a
reasonable interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S at 843-44. “Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S at 844.
i. Arbitrary and capricious is the appropriate standard of review
because the agency engaged in fact finding.
Formal adjudication is, “adjudication required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, except to
the extent that there is involved . . . hearing and decision on notice and in
accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title.” 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1966).
An agency’s interpretation and implementation of a statute is afforded
Chevron deference when, “Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). Such
delegations can be demonstrated “by an agency's power to engage in
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other
indication of a comparable congressional intent.” Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at
227. Thus, only formal adjudications are afforded Chevron deference. To
determine whether the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious, the
court must look into “whether the decision was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors and whether there had been a clear error of judgment.”
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
In this case, the agency engaged in informal, adjudicative fact finding.
Following the holding of Mead, an agency is afforded Chevron deference
only when it engages in rulemaking and formal adjudication. The informal
adjudication here should not receive Chevron deference and should be
subjected to arbitrary and capricious review. While the agency does have
the power to engage in formal adjudication or rulemaking, in the present
case, the agency used its authority to engage in informal adjudication in
determining the eligibility of the Miseño’s land. This is evidenced by the
fact that the statute enabling the Secretary to take land into trust for tribes
does not provide for the requirements of 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and 557.
The process of taking land into trust is informal adjudication because the
statute does not provide for the requirements of § 554. Accordingly,
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Chevron deference is not appropriate and only arbitrary and capricious
review should be afforded.
ii. Even if the Secretary’s decision is entitled to Chevron deference, the
decision is arbitrary and capricious.
To determine whether the agency’s decision was arbitrary and
capricious, the court must look into “whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there had been a clear
error of judgment.” Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402, 416. As long as a
regulation exists, it has the force of law. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 695 (1974). Thus, an agency is required to follow its regulations
because they have the same force of law as a statute. “There is, then, at least
a presumption that [congressional policy and agency regulation] will be
carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to. From this presumption
flows the agency's duty to explain its departure from prior norms.”
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973).
The court must look into “whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there had been a clear
error of judgment.” Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
When taking land into trust for a tribe, the Secretary must consider:
(a) The existence of statutory authority for the acquisition and
any limitations contained in such authority; (b) The need of the
individual Indian or the tribe for additional land; (c) The
purposes for which the land will be used; . . . (e) If the land to be
acquired is in unrestricted fee status, the impact on the State and
its political subdivisions resulting from the removal of the land
from the tax rolls; (f) Jurisdictional problems and potential
conflicts of land use which may arise; and (g) If the land to be
acquired is in fee status, whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs is
equipped to discharge the additional responsibilities resulting
from the acquisition of the land in trust status.
25 C.F.R. § 151.11 (1980). In this case, the Secretary failed to follow the
agency regulations and did not consider all relevant factors. First, he failed
to fully consider existing statutory authority because the Miseño did not
qualify for land to be taken into trust. Further, the ROD does not
demonstrate that the Secretary fully considered the purpose for which the
land will be used, the impact to the State of California, jurisdictional
problems, and whether the BIA is equipped to take on the responsibility of
the new land acquisition. The ROD is arbitrary and capricious because the
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Secretary deviated from the agency’s regulations to which he is bound and
did not consider all relevant factors in the record.
Additionally, the Secretary made a clear error in judgment. The Miseño,
as a tribe, were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The fact that the
federally appointed Indian agent for California and the sub-agent for Indian
Affairs for Southern California never mentioned the Miseño in their reports
or documents weighs heavily against the argument that the Miseño were
under federal jurisdiction at that time. R. at 1. Further, the Miseño’s village
was located outside of the land reserved under the 1852 Treaty of
Temecula. R. at 1. No Miseño leader took part in the negotiation of, or was
a signatory to, any of the nineteen treaties between the federal government
and the California Indian people. R. at 1. These facts strongly indicate that
the Miseño had little-to-no contact with the federal government.
Accordingly, the Miseño were neither recognized nor under federal
jurisdiction on or before 1934. Thus, the Secretary’s conclusion is arbitrary
and capricious.
In arriving at the conclusion that the Miseño were under federal
jurisdiction, the Secretary provides the following facts as support: (1) the
Miseño fit within categories of the 1851 Act to Ascertain and Settle Private
Lands Claims; (2) the Miseño qualified under the 1891 Mission Indian
Relief Act; (3) several Miseño children attended the Sherman Indian
Boarding School in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s; and (4) the Miseño
received payments made to California Indians in 1944 and 1974 under the
California Indians Jurisdictional Act and Indians Claims Commission Act,
respectively. None of these facts are sufficient to support a conclusion that
the Miseño were under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
The 1851 Act to Ascertain and Settle Private Lands Claims in the State
of California provides that “it shall be the duty of the commissioners . . . to
ascertain and report . . . the tenure by which the mission lands are held . . .
and also those which are occupied and cultivated by Pueblos or Rancheros
Indians.” 9 Stat. 631-34 at 634 (1851). If this section applied to the Miseño,
it would provide strong support for finding the Miseño under federal
jurisdiction. However, the facts are clear that the commissioners appointed
to California never mentioned the Miseño in their documents or reports.
Further, in the 1891 Mission Indian Relief Act, Congress appointed
commissioners “to arrange a just and satisfactory settlement of the Mission
Indians residing in the State of California” and authorized the
commissioners “to select a reservation for each band or village of the
Mission Indians.” 26 Stat. 712, 712 (1891). Again, the facts indicate that
the commissioners appointed by the Secretary never documented or
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reported any contact with the Miseño. If these federal acts never mentioned
the Miseño, then the tribe cannot argue that they were under federal
jurisdiction at the time.
The Secretary also points to the 1891 Mission Indians Relief Act as a
basis for his conclusion, but the Act does support a conclusion that the
Miseño were recognized or under federal jurisdiction. The Act authorizes
the commissioner “to arrange a just and satisfactory settlement of the
Mission Indians residing in [California], . . . to select a reservation for each
band or village of the Mission Indians . . . [;]” to set aside allotments for the
Bands of Indians; and to defend any claims to Mexican land grants for the
Indians.” 26 Stat. 712, 712-14 (1891). While the Secretary points to this Act
as a basis for his conclusion, the facts demonstrate that the commissioners
appointed to Southern California never documented any contact with the
Miseño. Further, the facts show that the federal government did not
recognize the Miseño until 1982. The fact that the Secretary points to an
Act to support his conclusion from which the Miseño never benefitted
indicates an arbitrary and capricious action.
The Secretary proceeds to cite the finding that several Miseño children
attended the Sherman Indian Boarding School in the 1920s, 1930s, and
1940s. While the children did attend school prior to 1934, this fact alone is
not determinative of federal jurisdiction over the Miseño. For example, it is
possible that the children might have been believed to be from a different
tribe given the federal government’s relationship with the “Mission
Indians” in the region. Id. The record does not support the conclusion that
Miseño children attended the school because the Miseño were under federal
jurisdiction.
The Secretary cites the fact that the Miseño received payments in 1944
and 1974 under the California Indians Jurisdictional Act and Indians Claims
Commission Act, respectively. The California Indians Jurisdictional Act
provides that “for the purposes of this Act the Indians of California shall be
defined to be all Indians who were residing in the State of California on
June 1, 1852[,] and their descendants now living in said State.” 45 Stat. 602
(1928). While it may be argued that the payments under this Act
demonstrate that the Miseño were either federally recognized or under
federal jurisdiction, mere payment under the act does not constitute federal
recognition or the status of being under federal jurisdiction. First, the
language expressly limits the definition of Indians for the purposes of this
Act; conversely, 25 U.S.C. § 479 provides the adequate definition for the
present purpose of taking land into trust. Second, the payments under the
Act were not made until well after 1934, the date required for federal
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jurisdiction provided in § 479. Third, the fact remains that the
commissioners never documented any contact with the Miseño which
would support the conclusion that the Miseño were either recognized, or
under federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the payments made under California
Indians Jurisdictional Act do not demonstrate that the Miseño were under
federal jurisdiction in 1934.
The Indian Claims Commission Act creates a commission to hear and
adjudicate claims made by Indians against the United States. 60 Stat. 1049,
1049-56 (1946). The Secretary cited payments made under this Act to
support the conclusion that the Miseño were under federal jurisdiction.
However, the Act does not include a definition of “Indian” and only
authorizes claims until 1946. Thus, the payments made to the Miseño may
have been for claims between 1934 and 1946. The Record is not clear about
claims for which those payments were made, but does clearly indicate that
there was little-to-no contact between the federal government and the
Miseño until the payments were made. Further, the payments were made
well after 1934. Accordingly, the Secretary’s reliance on these facts to
support his conclusion is arbitrary and capricious.
Finally, the ROD is arbitrary and capricious because the agency departed
from its own previous interpretation of the statute. Whenever an agency
departs from its prior interpretation of a statute, it must provide a reason for
doing so. Atchison, 412 U.S. 800. In 1936, Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
John Collier, interpreted the term “Indian” in the IRA to mean, “all persons
of Indian decent who are members of any recognized tribe that was under
Federal jurisdiction at the date of the Act.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379, 380
(quoting Letter from John Collier, Commissioner, to Superintendents (Mar.
7, 1936). The Court in Carcieri did not defer to this interpretation, but did
recognize that the Commissioner had interpreted the statute in that manner.
The Secretary’s new interpretation of the statute is at odds with prior
interpretations of the statute. The Secretary did not justify a change in
definition. Furthermore, the canons of statutory construction instruct an
agency and court to give effect to all parts of a statute. Accordingly, the
entire clause must be read together and given its full meaning. Because the
Secretary does not provide a justifiable basis for departing from its prior
interpretation, the agency’s new interpretation in the ROD is arbitrary and
capricious.
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D. The Miseño’s trust land does not fall within an exception to the
Carcieri rule.
The baseline rule is that for purposes of § 479, ‘now under Federal
jurisdiction’ refers to a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the time
of the statute’s enactment.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 382. Further, “§ 479 limits
the Secretary’s authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of
providing land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction
when the IRA was enacted in June 1934.” Id. at 382. Lower courts have
held that the Secretary may take land into trust for tribes so long as the
recognition happens before the land is taken into trust. See Confederated
Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. of Oregon v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552 (D.C.
Cir. 2016).
While the Court in Grand Ronde held that the Secretary could take land
into trust for tribes so long as the tribe was recognized before the land was
taken into trust, it relied on the fact that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
of 1988 (“IGRA”) authorizes the Secretary to take land into trust in certain
situations. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b). For instance, the Secretary may take land
into trust for gaming purposes if the land is part of “the initial reservation of
an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(ii). The Secretary may also take
land into trust if the land has been acquired as part of “the restoration of
lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal recognition.” 25 U.S.C. §
2719(b)(1)(B)(iii); see City of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir.
2003). Before taking land into trust for gaming purposes, the Secretary
must consult with the Governor of the state in concluding that gaming
would be beneficial to the tribe and non-detrimental to the surrounding
community. 25 C.F.R. § 151.11. Thus, an exception to Carcieri exists for
tribes to take land into trust: the land must have been initially requested into
trust for gaming purposes under IGRA.
In this case, the facts clearly show that the land had not been
contemplated as an IGRA acquisition. In order to fall within an exception
listed in § 2719, the Secretary should have undertaken the process of
consulting with the Governor; and because the process never occurred, the
land does not fall within an exception to Carcieri. Accordingly, the
Secretary has no authority to take the land into trust because the tribe was
not under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
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II. Section 5 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 465, is an unconstitutional exercise of
Congressional authority barred by the nondelegation doctrine and the
Tenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court should reach the merits of the case because Congress
has granted the Secretary a power that does not conform to an intelligible
principle, and therefore violates the nondelegation doctrine. When Congress
confers a legislative power to an executive agency, they must adequately
define who gets to exercise the power, the purpose behind it, and limit the
extent of its use. Am. Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
Congress plainly failed to meet two of these standards in drafting § 465. As
a result, the Secretary has been given an unchecked power to take any land
into trust on the behalf of Indians, which is an improper delegation of
legislative power.
Additionally, the authority of the Secretary to place state land into trust
is not written in the Constitution and supersedes the rights of the state of
California. While the Indian Commerce Clause has historically granted a
wide berth for Congress to manage Indian affairs, it does not mention the
land into trust process. The Tenth Amendment specifically reserves those
rights to the states if they have not been delegated to the federal
government. U.S. Const. amend. X. As a result, courts have been willing to
limit the Indian Commerce Clause when it interferes with state land or
rights. The Secretary’s action of placing state land into trust without
California’s consent erodes state sovereignty, and runs up against the
threshold of the Tenth Amendment, federalism, and the equal footing
doctrine.
A. 25 U.S.C. § 465 is an unconstitutional delegation of authority because
it fails to provide an adequate intelligible principle for the Secretary.
The Constitution states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. Const., art. 1, § 1.
Congress violates the nondelegation doctrine when it “delegate[s] its
legislative power to another branch of Government.” Touby v. United
States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991). However, “[i]f Congress shall lay down
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body. . . is
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.” J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States., 276 U.S.
394, 409 (1928). The point where Congress has created an intelligible
principle has not been precisely defined; however, the Court should
consider “if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”
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Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989) (quoting Am.
Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 105). Statutes have been struck down for
the legislature’s failure to properly define the agency’s authority in Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); or for overreliance on an
ambiguous term like “fair competition” in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States., 295 U.S. 495, 531 (1935). The prevailing application of
the nondelegation doctrine has been decidedly liberal since these older
cases. Nevertheless, the Court has reaffirmed the application of the
nondelegation doctrine in a modern context. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst.,
Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
When the legislature delegates power to an agency, they must define the
extent of its reach, and failure to do so risks an unconstitutional delegation.
§ 465 provides improperly delegated legislative power because the act
does not sufficiently limit the Secretary’s discretion with an intelligible
principle. The act authorizes the Secretary to take on and off-reservation
land into trust for Indians. Under the Mistretta factors, the act only satisfies
the identification prong since the power is clearly assigned to the Secretary.
Congress does not delineate the policy behind the action or the boundaries
of the Secretary’s delegated authority in § 465. The closest the act comes to
providing general policy behind the delegation is that the Secretary may
acquire land “for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. §
465. At best, this logic is circular. A policy should do more than restate the
action that the agency has been permitted to take through legislative
delegation. Other courts have claimed the general policy of the land into
trust process is plain by citing the legislative history preceding the IRA. See
South Dakota v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 2005)
(The court referred to comments made by Senator Wheeler). The policy
behind the act should be apparent, rather than hidden in the legislative
history. Congress is expected to provide a clear intelligible principle
through “legislative act,” rather than the bill’s history. J.W. Hampton Jr., &
Co., 276 U.S. at 409. On its face, the § 465 language does not frame the
policy behind the land into trust process. A party primarily relying on
legislative history to demonstrate the policy of an act is standing on shaking
ground. After all, “Congress . . . does not, one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
Furthermore, the act barely provides any stipulations on the Secretary’s
ability to take land into trust. The Secretary has the discretion “to
acquire . . . any interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands,
within or without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise
restricted allotments, whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the
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purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 465. This language
grants unfettered discretion to the Secretary to take any land they see fit
into trust. Any land can be taken into trust if done to provide “land for
Indians.” Id. Under such broad authority, any land acquisition is defensible.
Consequently, Justices of the Court have been willing to consider whether
the Secretary’s authority to place lands into trust is an unconstitutional
delegation of power. Dept. of Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919, 920
(1996) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). When the Eighth Circuit held § 465 an
invalid delegation of power under the nondelegation doctrine in South
Dakota v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 885 (8th Cir. 1995), the
Department responded with a regulation on the land into process. Dept. of
Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. at 920. The Department recognized that
their delegated power had not been adequately narrowed. 25 C.F.R. §
151.12 requires the Secretary publish any decision to take land into trust,
and permits any party to seek judicial review of the decision. Nevertheless,
this action should not override the fact that Congress has the duty to define
the boundaries of an agency’s delegated power. The Court has “never
suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute.”
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472. In assessing the validity of a nondelegation
claim, the Court should examine the act in isolation from subsequent nonlegislative changes. In fact, the Department’s self-imposed regulation
demonstrates the lackluster job Congress did defining the limits on the
Secretary’s discretion. Congress has the sole duty to draft an effective
intelligible principle. Therefore, the Department’s relatively recent
regulation cannot save § 465 from a nondelegation challenge.
B. 25 U.S.C. § 465 violates the Tenth Amendment because the right to
put land into trust is not explicitly granted in the Indian Commerce
Clause and is an overreach of Federal power into the state’s
sovereignty.
The Indian Commerce Clause has been interpreted by the Court to grant
Congress “plenary power to legislate . . . Indian affairs.” Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). Still, the power of the
Indian Commerce Clause is not absolute in the face of state’s rights. See
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (holding that
Congress’s complete authority over Indian affairs does not preempt state
sovereign immunity). § 465 is an example of Congress exceeding its
constitutional grant. The Constitution reserves all powers not delegated to
the United States to the individual states. U.S. Const. amend. X. It does not
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delegate Congress the right to put land into trust without permission from
the state where the land is located. The concept that the Secretary can
acquire land and put it into trust, thereby transferring land from state to
tribal and federal jurisdiction, is contrary to federalism, the Tenth
Amendment, and the equal footing doctrine.
The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.” Id. A natural reading of the
amendment demands that any limitation on state’s rights should be clearly
stated. Ambiguity should be interpreted in favor of the states and their
citizens because any power not delegated to the federal government is
reserved to the states. While the Indian Commerce Clause has been
interpreted to give all-encompassing authority over Indian affairs to the
federal government, courts have been careful about justifying widereaching discretion when it conflicts with the integrity of state territory. The
Court has said, “Congress cannot, after statehood, reserve or convey
submerged lands that ‘ha[ve] already been bestowed’ upon a State.” Idaho
v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 280 n.9 (2001). The Court took this notion
beyond submerged territory when it suggested that Congress would “raise
grave constitutional concerns if it purported to ‘cloud’ Hawaii's title to its
sovereign lands more than three decades after the State's admission to the
Union.” Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 176 (2009).
The Secretary’s authority to take land into trust undermines a state’s
internal jurisdiction because it allows state sovereign territory to be
transferred beyond their jurisdiction without their permission.
A California court ejected the Miseño from their remaining land title in
1881. R. at 1. Thus, California has had authority over their territory since
statehood. If California had the right to quiet the Miseño’s title, it is
inconsistent to allow the Secretary to restore their territory rather than the
state. California may restore the Miseño’s title or other land should they
want; however, § 465 permits the Secretary to overreach and act
unilaterally, thereby depriving California of a right they had when the
Miseño were ejected. The Secretary has a policy to restore tribal lands
throughout the country, and it is by no means inconsistent with federalism
or the Tenth Amendment, but the current approach is improper. The
Secretary should facilitate a working relationship between the Miseño and
California, rather than restore the Miseño’s land base more than a century
after they had last had any title.
A narrower version of this argument is found in the history between the
federal government and the Miseño, or lack thereof. The Indian Affairs
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agents for California did not mention the Miseño in any reports, nor the
Miseño participate in any treaty between California Indian tribes or the
federal government. R. at 1. Until the recognition of the Miseño in 1982,
the tribe and the United States did not have a relationship, but they did with
California. R. at 2. The Miseño were removed from their last village in
1881 by the state, and continued to live under state jurisdiction for the next
century until they gained federal recognition. R. at 1-2. Tribal citizens of a
federally recognized tribe have many rights that do not infringe on a state’s
rights, like health care provisions and political status, but those that affect
state jurisdiction may conflict with federalism and the Tenth Amendment.
In this instance, where the tribe interacted with the state instead of the
federal government since statehood, the risk of infringing on California is
even greater. Consequently, the Court should limit the Secretary’s ability to
put land into trust for newly recognized tribes because the Constitution does
not delegate this power to Congress. This is especially the case when the
state, rather than the federal government, has historically had jurisdiction
over the tribe.
Furthermore, the equal footing doctrine stands for “the constitutional
principle that all States are admitted to the Union with the same attributes
of sovereignty . . . as the original 13 States.” Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 203 (1999). This argument has been
ineffective in cases dealing with treaty rights. See id. at 208 (holding the
equal footing doctrine does not implicitly abrogate treaty rights);
Washington v. Buchanan, 138 Wash. 2d 186, 213 (Wash. 1999) (affirming
the inapplicability of treaty abrogation via the equal footing doctrine).
However, the Miseño are acquiring more than treaty rights that were never
abrogated. The Secretary’s ROD will grant the Miseño title to land that they
have not claimed since the nineteenth century, and a right that the state had
extinguished. The fact that California successfully and legally removed the
Miseño from the land demonstrates that this land had been regarded as the
state’s they were admitted to the union. To allow the Secretary to transfer
the land after statehood violates the equal footing doctrine by minimizing a
key element of California’s sovereignty. Ultimately, § 465 is
unconstitutional under federalism, the Tenth Amendment, and the equal
footing doctrine because the federal government overextends their reach
into what has been recognized as crucial aspects of state sovereignty.
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Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment made by the District Court
for the Central District of California, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit should be reversed. The Court should prevent the
Secretary from taking land into trust on the behalf of the Miseño.
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